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Wojciech Konończuk, Tadeusz Iwański, Tadeusz Olszański and Piotr Żochowski
The post-Maidan Ukrainian government found itself forced to launch a comprehensive state 
reform process due to both the deep crisis in all the key areas of the state’s operation and 
the enormous demand for change among the Ukrainian public. The promise to carry out 
structural reforms based on the European model became a key point in Kyiv’s political rhe-
toric. However, one year after the formation of the second cabinet led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk 
(2 December 2014) and one and a half years since the inauguration of Petro Poroshenko as 
president (7 June 2014), it is clear that the reform process in Ukraine is moving at a snail’s 
pace and is far from fulfilling its post-Maidan declarations. It has also provoked increasing 
frustration among the public due to the lack of expected effects. 
Over the past few months Kyiv has initiated a few major changes, the most significant of 
which include: starting work on the decentralisation of the state; initiating the process 
of reforming the judiciary system and creating anti-corruption institutions; and launching 
reforms of the gas and internal security sectors. In each of these areas it can be said that this 
is merely the beginning of a process which is far from complete. Difficulties in the reform 
process are occurring because in most areas simply bringing the institutions responsible for 
a given section of the state’s life back to effective operation will be insufficient and they have 
to be rebuilt from the ground up. 
Delays in the reform process are growing. This is due to a number of factors, the most im-
portant of which are: strong resistance from the circles whose interests are at stake; rivalry 
between the various political players for maintaining control over a given area of operation 
of the state; conflicting interests and disputes between the four parties which form the go-
vernment coalition; the influence of oligarchs linked to individual groups in the government; 
and the Ukrainian bureaucracy’s inefficiency and corruption. In some areas there is a lack of 
political will visible in the government. This is because the political elite has been changed 
only to a limited extent after Maidan. Last but not least, the reforms have been slowed down 
because a large part of the state administration had to make efforts to defend the country as 
a consequence of Russian aggression. 
In effect, pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the EU (both of which made 
their aid to Ukraine facing bankruptcy which dependent on the introduction of specific le-
gal and institutional changes) became the key stimulus for initiating the most important 
reforms in Ukraine. The previous experience of reforms which were carried out only halfway 
and which were far from being finalised has shown that bringing the Ukrainian state to 
a healthy condition – and thus getting rid of the post-Soviet mechanisms of its operation and 
implementing European models – will be a long-lasting process that will require firm action, 
including the effective combating of corruption. 
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The ambitious promises
During the first few months after Maidan, all the 
major Ukrainian politicians declared a systemic 
modernisation of the country to be their prior-
ity. Petro Poroshenko, who was elected presi-
dent in late May 2014, for example said that the 
reforms are “another stage of our revolution”, 
“the route of tectonic changes which we must 
not go through but rather run through, [be-
cause] the alternative is total collapse”1. In turn, 
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk presenting 
his cabinet in the Verkhovna Rada said “we are 
ready for  the most radical, the most stringent 
and the most effective reforms”2. The presiden-
tial National Reform Council, an advisory body 
for strategic planning, was established in July 
2014. Two months later, President Poroshen-
ko presented a document entitled Strategy of 
Reforms 2020 envisaging sixty reforms “of the 
system and concerning all political, economic 
and social institutions” which should be “imple-
mented almost simultaneously”3. 
President Poroshenko mentioned the following 
among the priority reforms: 
• combating corruption
• changes in the bureaucratic apparatus,
• the judiciary
• decentralisation
• tax reform
• deregulation and development of entrepre-
neurship
• security system reform
• energy reform.
1 President Petro Poroshenko’s speech during the ‘Strategy 
2020’ conference of 25 September 2014 and during his 
address to the Verkhovna Rada on 27 November 2014.
2 Inauguration speech of Prime Minister Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk, 2 December 2015. 
3 President Petro Poroshenko’s speech during the ‘Strate-
gy of Reforms 2020’ conference of 25 September 2014.
The changes were thus intended to cover al-
most all the key areas of the state’s operation. 
Even though intensive fights continued at that 
time in Donbass, the Ukrainian president de-
clared (and many other politicians repeated 
this) that “military actions should not be used 
as an excuse for the lack of reforms”4.
Only a few moves linked to reforms were made 
in 2014. This low level of activity, and thus 
failure to capitalise on the social mobilisation 
which reached its peak at that time, resulted on 
the one hand from the electoral calendar, i.e. 
the snap presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions (on 25 May and 26 October respectively), 
and on the other from the active phase of the 
military operation in Donbass. 
The most important steps taken were: 
• the reinstatement of the constitution in the 
2004 version, and thus re-enactment of the 
parliamentary-presidential system (February); 
• the launch of the judiciary reform (April); 
• adopting the acts on public prosecution au-
thorities and lustration (September) and on 
counteracting corruption, and on the estab-
lishment of the National Anti-Corruption Of-
fice (October)5. 
The fact that pro-European forces gained a ma-
jority in the new Verkhovna Rada and formed 
a coalition that was capable of amending the 
constitution built up hope that the reforms 
would be launched within a short timeframe6. 
President Poroshenko declared on the first an-
niversary of Maidan, “Firing back at the aggres-
sor with one hand we are speeding up reforms 
with the other. In 2014, we preserved Ukraine. 
2015 must become crucial for the introduction 
of fundamental changes in the construction of 
4 President Poroshenko’s speech during his meeting with 
representatives of civil society, 9 July 2014.
5 The parliament’s insufficient engagement was criticised 
by some clear-sighted foreign observers, who began 
a few months after the elections to share their opinion that 
Ukraine was wasting time and that the reforms should be 
launched during the first year of the government’s oper-
ation. One example of this was the speech given by the 
former Georgian economy minister Kakha Bendukidze.
6 For more, see: Tadeusz A. Olszański, A strong vote for 
reform: Ukraine after the parliamentary elections, OSW, 
29 October 2014.
After Maidan, all the major Ukrainian pol-
iticians declared a systemic modernisa-
tion of the country to be their priority.
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a new state”7. Below is an attempt to evaluate 
the reforms (or lack thereof) in the key areas.
The amendment of the constitution 
and decentralisation
The Ukrainian government withdrew from de-
veloping a comprehensive draft of a new con-
stitution, instead choosing to amend some of 
the provisions of the one in place. Two draft 
amendments of the constitution have been pre-
pared so far: one limiting the immunity of MPs 
and judges (approved by the Constitutional 
Court in June 2015) and one concerning the de-
centralisation of the country and vesting local 
governments with greater powers (adopted in 
the first reading on 31 August 2015). The third 
draft concerning the judiciary was put forward 
at the end of November. The draft amendments 
which envisage stripping MPs and judges of im-
munity means that one of Maidan’s demands 
will be met, but this is clearly an unpopular 
move among the political elite.
The decentralisation project envisages a funda-
mental reform of the state through the introduc-
tion of a new three-level organisation of the lo-
cal government and by significantly cutting back 
the central administration’s competences with 
regard to local communities. These latter will be 
vested with a very broad spectrum of powers, 
thus becoming the real organisers of social life 
in the regions. Local state administration bodies 
currently in place will be liquidated and replaced 
with prefectures which will have supervisory and 
coordination competences8. The implementation 
of this reform will lead to a modernisation of the 
state, will stimulate other essential changes and 
trigger regional development. Therefore, it can 
be said that decentralisation is one of the key 
reform projects launched after Maidan. 
7 The Ukrainian president’s speech at the ceremony com-
memorating the first anniversary of Maidan, 20 Febru-
ary 2015.
8 For a more extensive outline of this project see: Tadeusz 
A. Olszański, Ukraine is divided over constitutional re-
form, OSW, 2 September 2015.
Although the draft is well-prepared, it is at pres-
ent unlikely to be adopted in the second reading 
(scheduled for the end of 2015) since it requires 
a qualified majority (300 votes). This is because 
the regulations introducing the draft contain 
the provision stating that “the special manner of 
operation of some districts in Donetsk and Lu-
hansk oblasts is regulated under a separate act” 
(article 18), which has become the subject of 
massive criticism from part of the government 
coalition and public opinion who fear that this 
opens up the way to introducing autonomy for 
Donbass. These provisions are an attempt to im-
plement the provisions of the Minsk Agreement 
which are disadvantageous to Ukraine (point 11). 
Combining the issue of the region’s special sta-
tus with the decentralisation act is in fact block-
ing this extremely important reform, and poses 
the risk that it will not be implemented. 
As part of preparations for the reform of lo-
cal government in February 2015, parliament 
passed an act enabling silradas (rural councils; 
there are 10,000 of them) to unite into larger 
communes which will have much greater fi-
nancial and organisational opportunities, as 
a result of which local governments of the low-
est level would be strengthened. The process 
commenced in summer 2015 and is, at least 
in theory, voluntary. However, it is clear that 
oblast administrations have been developing 
plans for the small councils to unite into bigger 
units, and have been putting pressure on their 
councils to expedite this. According to data 
available in early November, 151 of the 800–
900 planned new communes have been creat-
ed, which means that it is moving too slowly. 
Furthermore, the budget and the fiscal codes 
were amended at the end of 2014, resulting in 
Combining in the Minsk Agreement the 
issue of the region’s special status with 
the decentralisation act is in fact blocking 
this extremely important reform.
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more money becoming available as part of lo-
cal budgets since 1 January 2015. One source 
of these additional funds are the additional 
incomes from excise duty and the real estate 
tax9. Furthermore, the act on the registration of 
individuals and corporate entities was amend-
ed in November 2015, offering more extensive 
competences to local governments in this area, 
and further ‘decentralising’ amendments were 
made to the fiscal code. 
The judiciary reform 
Soon after being sworn in, President Poroshen-
ko branded the judiciary reform “the reform of 
all reforms”10, promising that this will be one 
of the first and major changes. Already in April 
2014, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law “on 
bringing back confidence in the judiciary”, and 
passed a new act on the public prosecution au-
thorities last September (it became effective in 
July this year). The former had introduced major 
changes in the system of courts of general ju-
risdiction and also lifted the restrictions which 
had been imposed on the competences of the 
Supreme Court under the act of July 2010. 
Furthermore, President Poroshenko established 
a Council for Judiciary Reform in September 
2014, which developed a bill which guarantees 
the right to a fair trial which was enacted by 
parliament in February 2015. The most import-
ant changes include bringing back the strong 
position of the Supreme Court and enabling 
the ‘certification’ of judges (verification of their 
9 Their incomes increased by 37% in the first six months of 
2015. 
10 President Poroshenko’s speech at the meeting of the Na-
tional Reform Council, 7 August 2014.
professional competences and integrity). One 
weakness of this process is that presiding judg-
es will be elected by the judges of the same 
courts, which will lead to the existing system 
being entrenched (around 60% of the previous 
presiding judges have been re-elected)11.
The changes made so far, and especially the at-
tempt to carry out a major staff clear-out in the 
judiciary and public prosecution authorities, 
have met with strong resistance from these cir-
cles. The procedure for introducing changes in 
the judiciary corps has also been criticised by 
some non-governmental organisations, who 
insist that all judges need to be dismissed and 
then hired as part of a competition procedure. 
However, this solution could disrupt the oper-
ation of the judiciary. The plans include essen-
tially improving the independence of judges 
by shifting the competence of making staffing 
decisions from the president and parliament 
to the newly established Supreme Council of 
Justice. The president may appoint judges only 
upon a motion by the council, and decisions 
to dismiss judges will be taken by the council 
alone. It is not planned for independence to be 
granted to the public prosecution authorities. 
However, the public prosecution authorities will 
no longer have the function of general supervi-
sion over law enforcement, and parliament will 
no longer be able to bring a motion of no con-
fidence with regard to the prosecutor general. 
The changes which have already been made in 
the judiciary can be summed up as steps in the 
right direction, albeit still insufficient. They have 
failed to meet the far-reaching expectations of 
the public, especially as regards eliminating cor-
ruption among judges. However, this is impos-
sible to achieve through judiciary reform alone, 
since effective anti-corruption actions are need-
ed. On the other hand, excessive radical changes, 
especially among the staff working for courts, 
may disrupt the functioning of the judiciary. 
11 The Supreme Council of Justice has brought motions to 
dismiss almost 400 judges, but the Verkhovna Rada has 
dismissed only 127 of them so far (the total number of 
judges being around 8,000).
The changes which have already been 
made in the judiciary can be summed up 
as steps in the right direction, albeit still 
insufficient.
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The government has promised to adopt more 
legislative acts. Already in May this year, Pres-
ident Poroshenko approved the strategy for 
reforming the administration of justice for 
2015–2020 which envisages, for example, 
changes in the criminal and civil procedure 
codes and serious changes in the act on legal 
practice. A further amendment to the act on 
the right to a fair trial is also being prepared. 
Combating corruption…
All Ukrainian public opinion polls indicate that 
corruption is viewed as the main challenge for 
the state (alongside the conflict in Donbass). In 
Transparency International’s corruption percep-
tion ranking Ukraine was ranked 142nd among 
the 175 countries covered in 2014. For this rea-
son, anti-corruption measures have been men-
tioned as one of the key issues in all the po-
litical manifestos announced by the Ukrainian 
president and prime minister. It has been clear 
from the very beginning that it will be impos-
sible to reform the state (including the public 
administration system) unless anti-corruption 
policy rules are introduced and a comprehen-
sive system of state institutions to combat cor-
ruption is created. Regardless of this, the first 
moves to combat corruption were made as late 
as October 2014, when the Verkhovna Rada ad-
opted a package of anti-corruption laws. These 
envisaged, for example, the establishment of 
two specialised institutions: the National An-
ti-Corruption Bureau (NACB) in charge of pre-
venting, disclosing, combating and detecting 
corruption crimes in the state administration, 
and the National Agency for Prevention of Cor-
ruption (NAPC) tasked with checking whether 
state officials’ income declarations are correct. 
Establishing these authorities was one of the 
conditions under which financial assistance was 
to be offered to Ukraine by the International 
Monetary Fund. 
The Ukrainian government declared that the 
anti-corruption institutions would begin their 
operation in January 2015, but it turned out 
very quickly that these flagship actions would 
be introduced with a massive delay from the 
very beginning. The main challenges include 
the recruitment and training of the staff as 
well as developing the rules of co-operation 
with other law enforcement agencies. The 
head of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
was selected only in April 2015, and the first 
detectives started their work six months later. 
Even more serious delays have been seen in the 
launch of the National Agency for Prevention 
of Corruption which reports to the government 
and which, unlike the NACB, will only be an 
inspectorate, with no operational or investiga-
tive competences. The NAPC will begin its work 
only around February–March 2016, provided 
that its head has been appointed by that time. 
The activity of the anti-corruption bodies will be 
supervised by the Specialised Anti-Corruption 
Prosecutor’s Office established on 22 September 
2015 under the act on prosecution authorities 
as a separate body within the structure of the 
Prosecutor General’s Office. The establishment 
of this institution is one of the conditions the EU 
set in order for a visa-free regime with Ukraine 
to be introduced. However, some controversies 
have arisen over the past few weeks concern-
ing the makeup of the commission which chose 
the institution’s head and prosecutors. The ef-
fectiveness of the operation of the Anti-Cor-
ruption Prosecutor’s Office will fully depend 
on the reform of the prosecution authorities as 
a whole and on the verification of their staff.
On 10 November 2015, the Verkhovna Rada 
passed an act establishing both the National 
Agency for Tracing and Managing Corrupt As-
The reform of anti-corruption bodies in 
Ukraine has so far been limited to adopt-
ing the basic legal acts regulating their 
operation.
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sets and also amendments to regulations con-
cerning the confiscation of criminal assets. The 
agency, which will begin operation within a few 
months at the earliest is expected to collect infor-
mation on the proceeds gained from corruption 
practices and make it available to investigators, 
and also to manage the assets following arrest. 
The reform of anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine 
has so far been limited to adopting the basic 
legal acts regulating their operation. The newly 
established institutions have not in fact begun 
their operation due to the excessively long pro-
cess of staff recruitment and training, which 
prevents them from carrying out their tasks. 
…and the lustration 
The so-called government clean-up (lustration) 
process is a separate issue. An act regulating this 
was passed a few weeks ahead of the parliamen-
tary election in 2014 in response to extremely 
strong pressure from the Ukrainian public that 
corrupt officials, prosecutors and judges be 
eliminated from public life12. However, the lus-
tration process has encountered great difficul-
ties, and the act itself has been contested at the 
Constitutional Court (the proceedings are under-
way). One year since the launch of the lustration 
process, around 10% of those who must under-
go this procedure (according to estimates, their 
number is between 700,000 and 900,000) have 
been checked. Given the fact that this procedure 
was to be conducted in 2015–2016, this is not 
12 For more information, see: Tadeusz A. Olszański, The 
Ukrainian Lustration Act, OSW, 1 October 2014.
a satisfactory result. According to rough data, 
the number of people who are banned from 
holding public functions as a consequence of the 
lustration process does not exceed 10%. Howev-
er, it should be noted that a significant number 
(it has not been defined precisely) of officials 
who are eligible for lustration avoided it by re-
signing from their offices. Another way to be 
exempted from this obligation is to obtain a cer-
tificate proving participation in the military op-
eration in eastern Ukraine (whether authentic or 
false), which provides automatically exemption 
from lustration procedures. 
Other serious problems include the chaotic 
wording of the lustration act, the ambiguity of 
some of its provisions and the poor preparation 
of the lustration procedure. It was a mistake to 
entrust lustration to the heads of individual in-
stitutions, which in effect undermines the reli-
ability and the effectiveness of the lustration. 
It is a commonly held opinion that the govern-
ment clean-up process has failed to bring the 
expected results partly because MPs, mayors 
and city councillors have not been obliged to 
undergo lustration procedures.
The internal security sector reform
Under pressure from public mood and given the 
need to fulfil the condition set by the EU and 
the IMF, the Ukrainian government must face the 
challenge of carrying out a structural reform of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which will in fact 
be transformed into a new ministry by 2016. On 
2 July 2015, the Verkhovna Rada adopted acts: 
on internal affairs agencies and on the Nation-
al Police. According to the former, the following 
agencies will be included in the system of inter-
nal affairs agencies: the National Police, the Na-
tional Service for Emergency Situations (which 
at present reports to the ministry of defence), 
the National Migration Service and the National 
Guard. This means that the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs will play a more important role in the sys-
tem of security authorities, and that the position 
The government clean-up process has 
failed to bring the expected results partly 
because MPs, mayors and city councillors 
have not been obliged to undergo lustra-
tion procedures.
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of the ministry’s head has strengthened signifi-
cantly. The progress made in reforming the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs so far includes: embed-
ding the Traffic Police (DAI) in the patrol service, 
the liquidation of the Directorate for Combating 
Organised Crime and entrusting the criminal po-
lice block with its functions, creating a special 
police unit named KORD modelled on America’s 
SWAT in place of existing troops (including Ber-
kut, Sokol and Hryfon). 
The National Police Act sets the legal principles 
for the organisation and the operation of police 
forces, the status of police officers and the pro-
cedures applicable while on duty. The National 
Police will consist of the criminal police, patrol 
police, preliminary proceedings bodies, securi-
ty police, special police forces and elite special 
purpose police units. The new institution is ex-
pected to take its final form by April 2016 and 
is directed by a civilian head nominated by the 
Council of Ministers13. The establishment of the 
National Police has been very positively evalu-
ated by the public and is viewed as one of the 
greatest achievements of the new government. 
The recruitment of new staff undermines the 
reform’s effectiveness. The need to replace 
most of the officers who until recently served 
in the militsiya, a formation which is generally 
viewed as especially morally corrupt partly due 
to their \venality, will affect the tempo of form-
ing the National Police. 
As the new anticorruption services were cre-
ated, the competences of the Security Service 
of Ukraine (SBU) had to be reduced. In Octo-
ber this year, this agency lost its prerogatives 
to conduct investigations into economic and 
corruption crimes. The new SBU’s priorities will 
include counter-intelligence and combating ter-
rorism. Contrary to earlier declarations of the 
SBU’s leaders, a programme document setting 
out the guidelines for reforming this agency 
has not yet been presented. 
The conflict in Donbass made it clear to the 
13 Only a civilian will be able to be the minister of internal 
affairs. Khatia Dekanoidze, the former Georgian minister of 
education, was nominated the head of the National Police. 
government that the intelligence services had 
to be reformed (they were rather unsuccessful, 
especially concerning military surveillance). Their 
poor condition was the result of many years of 
negligence linked to the withdrawal from activ-
ity in the Russian direction, infiltration by the 
Russian services and, in the case of military in-
telligence, involvement in illegal arms trading. 
President Poroshenko has made moves which 
may be proof of an attempt to re-create the 
intelligence services. On 8 October 2014, he es-
tablished the Committee for Intelligence (as part 
of the structure of the National Security and De-
fence Council) tasked with controlling, analysing, 
coordinating and planning intelligence activities. 
On 12 November 2015, parliament passed the 
Act on the National Bureau of Investigations. 
This is expected to be an executive body re-
sponsible for preventing, tracing and prose-
cuting organised crime, felonies punishable by 
life imprisonment, war crimes, for prosecuting 
violations of human rights committed by public 
officers, including crimes committed by officers 
of the NACB and the Anti-Corruption Prose-
cutor’s Office. The bureau was established to 
meet another requirement set by the EU. How-
ever, as with other services, it will take a long 
time before it is formed. 
The economic reforms
The Ukrainian government’s activity in the eco-
nomic sector depends on the provisions of the 
loan aid programmes the IMF offered Ukraine 
as part of the Extended Fund Facility worth 
US$17.5 billion signed in February 2015. The 
reforms are taking place against the backdrop 
of the most severe economic crisis since the 
A visible problem is the lack of improvement 
in the conditions for the development of 
small and medium-sized firms and the still 
insufficient deregulation of the economy.
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late 1990s, one effect of which was GDP fall-
ing by 7.5% last year and by a forecasted 11% 
this year. However, over the past one and a half 
years, Kyiv has managed to achieve a relative 
stabilisation of the macroeconomic situation, 
to introduce floating exchange rate and to slow 
down the devaluation of the national curren-
cy, increase foreign currency reserves (from 
around US$5 billion to US$13 billion), generate 
a balance of payments surplus, increase state 
revenue from taxes, partly restructure foreign 
debt14, and also improve the situation and the 
transparency of the banking system (over 50 of 
180 existing banks face liquidation). 
Ukraine’s grey economy is estimated to be worth 
at least 47% of the country’s GDP15 and moves 
have been made to curb it by way of expanding 
(from 1 July) the list of entrepreneurs who have 
an obligation to have cash registers, and also 
to boost state revenues, for example, by intro-
ducing an electronic VAT management system 
(state revenues have increased by US$1.7 billion 
in effect of this move). In June, the Verkhovna 
Rada passed an act granting more autonomy 
to the National Bank of Ukraine, and in July it 
amended the act on the Accounting Chamber 
of Ukraine expanding its competences for au-
diting the way public funds are dispensed. In 
turn, in September, the parliament simplified 
the purchase and public procurement proce-
dures to curb corruption and improve com-
14 Owing to a deal struck with private creditors in August 
which provides, among other things, for the cancella-
tion of 20% of the debts (US$ 3.6 billion). For more in-
formation on this, see: Rafał Sadowski, Ukraine’s agree-
ment with private creditors, OSW, 2 September 2015.
15 According to data from the Ministry for Economic Develop-
ment, the grey economy may even be worth 56% of GDP.
petitiveness. In turn, it has been impossible to 
adopt new tax regulations and to complete the 
reform of the ineffective pension system. 
The changes introduced are still not com-
prehensive, and serious impediments remain 
which prevent their implementation; the lack 
of improvement in the conditions for the devel-
opment of small and medium-sized firms and 
the still insufficient deregulation of the econo-
my being the main problems. The World Bank’s 
annual Doing Business 2016 report, which was 
published at the end of October, suggests that 
the climate for doing business in Ukraine has 
improved only marginally. Improvement has 
been seen in three out of the ten categories 
examined. The situation has worsened in four 
categories and has remained unchanged in 
the remaining three. As a result, Ukraine was 
ranked 83rd among the countries covered by the 
report, moving up three positions16. 
The reforms in the energy sector
The passing of the law on the gas market in 
April 2015 has been the most important reform 
in Ukraine’s energy sector. This act envisages 
the adoption of the most important principles 
of the EU’s energy regulations, including the 
so-called third energy package. The implemen-
tation of this document was among the condi-
tions for Ukraine to receive a loan from the IMF. 
The main goals of this act included creating an 
effective gas market and transparent competi-
tion rules, and also the division of Naftogaz. The 
law came into force on 1 October and merely 
marks the beginning of the very complicated 
process of reforming and demonopolising the 
gas sector. It will, furthermore, be necessary 
to pass a number of other laws and executive 
acts. To date, the acts on improving Naftogaz’s 
financial stability and on transparency in the 
energy sector have been passed. Naftogaz 
16 Ease of doing business in Ukraine 2016. For comparison, 
Georgia was ranked 24th, Belarus 44th, Russia 51st and 
Moldova 52nd. 
Reforms in the energy sector have been 
implemented too slowly due to the 
Ukrainian bureaucracy’s indolence and 
also because the gas reform is the most 
difficult to be conducted.
9OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 192
has also managed to regain control over local 
gas distribution networks (known as oblhaz-
es) which had previously been controlled to 
a significant extent by oligarchs (mainly Dmytro 
Firtash). It was only in October that the gov-
ernment adopted (behind schedule) the action 
plan for launching the process of transforming 
Naftogaz into a corporation run in a transpar-
ent manner17. The document was passed under 
pressure from the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, which made grant-
ing Ukraine US$300 million for buying gas from 
Western suppliers dependent on this. 
Even though actions have already been tak-
en, reforms in the energy sector have been 
implemented too slowly due to the Ukrainian 
bureaucracy’s indolence and also because the 
gas reform is the most difficult to be conduct-
ed, given the fact that the tendency to gener-
ate corruption is inherent in it and considering 
the interests of the biggest Ukrainian business 
and political players18. One proof of this is the 
excessively long work on the establishment of 
an independent energy market regulator to re-
place the existing National Energy and Utilities 
Regulatory Commission. According to the bill 
under preparation, the new authority will have 
much more extensive competences; it will be 
vested with investigative functions and instru-
ments for protecting competition on the mar-
ket and imposing fines. The act is planned to 
fully comply with EU directive 2009/73/EC, but 
it clashes with the interests of the large players 
on the electric energy market, above all Rinat 
Akhmetov’s DTEK corporation, which has ap-
proximately A 30% share of the market.
Work on other reforms in the energy sector has 
17 The action plan in this area provides for shifting the com-
pany’s shares from the Ministry for Energy to the Council 
of Ministers, for depoliticisation and improving the perfor-
mance and transparency of Naftogaz’s operation, for ex-
ample by appointing a new supervisory board consisting of 
seven members (four of whom will be specialists selected as 
part of a competition) and enhancing its competences. 
18 See: Wojciech Konończuk, Reform #1. Why Ukraine has 
to reform its gas sector, OSW Commentary, no. 181, 
2 September 2015.
also been initiated. In April 2015, the Ministry 
for Energy presented guidelines for the coal in-
dustry reform. However, this is mainly a diag-
nostic document and is still awaiting approval 
from the government. The final version of the 
bill regulating the electric energy market was 
presented in September. It is of key significance 
for reforming the electric energy sector, and its 
tasks will include a demonopolisation of the 
market. Kyiv’s achievements also include the 
difficult decision made in February this year 
that in two years’ time the charges for gas and 
electricity for households will be raised (de-
pending on the group of customers it could be 
by as much as 300%) as will be for heating (by 
67%). Previous practice had detached the prices 
of these from the market due to political rea-
sons. As with other moves, this one has also 
been forced by the IMF. 
The evaluation and the future 
of Ukrainian reforms
The Ukrainian modernisation, given the size 
of the country and the scale of the existing 
problems, is unprecedented in the post-So-
viet area. Ukraine has been facing the chal-
lenge of reforming almost all the key areas of 
the state’s operation. Furthermore, the back-
ground in which the reforms are taking place 
– the war with Russia determined to thwart 
Ukraine’s successful modernisation, and the 
deep economic crisis – is extremely unfavour-
able. Another factor that lowers the readiness 
to change the system is the low quality of the 
Ukrainian political elite. Most of the new coun-
try leaders were part of the previous political 
The Ukrainian modernisation, given the 
size of the country and the scale of the 
existing problems, is unprecedented in 
the post-Soviet area.
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establishment and have held senior positions in 
the state administration over the past decade. 
Many of them still have links with the oligar-
chic milieus, and some (like President Poroshen-
ko) own large businesses themselves. Maidan 
gave rise only to new mid-level leaders, and the 
war has absorbed the attention of social activ-
ists almost completely, leaving freedom of ac-
tion to the old political and bureaucratic elite. 
As a result, the effort put into reform over the 
past year or so turn out to be insufficient, de-
spite the fact that under ‘normal’ circumstances 
they would have been an undoubted achieve-
ment, given the military conflict, the crisis in 
Ukrainian statehood and the Ukrainian public’s 
new expectations (often unrealistic). On the 
one hand, the government was able to initiate 
many reforms heading in the right direction, 
the most important of which are decentralisa-
tion, the beginning of judiciary reform, gas and 
banking sector reform, establishing anti-cor-
ruption institutions, slowing down the down-
ward trend in the economy and improving the 
functioning of financial institutions. But on the 
other hand, it can only be said that this is just 
the beginning of a difficult process in each of 
these areas, and the government’s inconsisten-
cy and delays in implementing many desirable 
solutions have been seen in most of the cases. 
Furthermore, the government has been unable 
to regain public confidence in the state.
One example which perfectly illustrates the scale 
of the Ukrainian government’s negligence is 
combating corruption, which has been one of 
Ukraine’s main problems. The anti-corruption 
bodies established a year ago are still to begin 
their operation, and some of them will have to 
wait months before they are able to start. It is 
difficult to resist the impression that the delays 
are the result of intentional efforts made by 
a section of the state apparatus. In effect, only 
11% of Ukrainians have noticed some improve-
ment in the fight against corruption, while 51% of 
them claim that the situation has worsened, and 
32% believe that nothing has changed19. The fact 
that the public has not felt any improvement of 
the situation is one of the new government’s big-
gest failures, and this has resulted in a dramatic 
decline in public support for them. Meanwhile, 
the future of Ukrainian reforms to a great extent 
depends on successful anti-corruption measures. 
Ukraine’s political system reform is also dead-
locked. Although a few positive solutions have 
been implemented (especially the new princi-
ples for financing political parties20 and the 
consolidation of smaller communes into larger 
units), the process of amending the constitu-
tion has faced numerous impediments. In the 
case of decentralisation, reform has been made 
dependent on Kyiv’s fulfilment of the provisions 
of the Minsk Agreement which are disadvan-
tageous to it. Lustration and judiciary reform 
has met with similarly strong institutional re-
sistance. One exception is the creation of the 
new police force, which has been the only 
clearly successful project to date. In the area 
of the economy, Kyiv has been unable to sig-
nificantly improve the conditions of developing 
entrepreneurship and doing business. Nor has 
it succeeded in reforming the fiscal system. It 
will be impossible to achieve sustainable eco-
nomic growth without extensive liberalisation, 
continued and deeper deregulation and further 
efforts to reorganise the banking sector.
At present the majority of the reforms con-
ducted have resulted in passing laws. Although 
19 Survey conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for IRI be-
tween 16 and 30 July 2015.
20 On 9 October, the Verkhovna Rada passed an act on the 
financing of political parties introducing subsidising politi-
cal parties from the state budget starting from the second 
quarter of 2017 and significantly reducing the possibilities 
individuals and companies have to finance political parties.
Pressure from the International Monetary 
Fund and the EU became the key stimulus 
for initiating the most important reforms 
in Ukraine.
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this is a natural beginning of the process, real 
change will take place once they have been put 
into effect, and this will need time, prepara-
tion, the passing of numerous regulatory acts 
of the lower rank (mainly governmental), build-
ing new structures and staff recruitment. It is 
already clear that these procedures are being 
implemented too slowly. It also seems that, at 
least in some cases, the statutory transitional 
periods (during which the procedures are to be 
executed) are too long. 
It needs to be emphasised that it has been pos-
sible to implement an essential part of the most 
important reforms owing to pressure from in-
ternational institutions which in fact forced the 
Ukrainian government to make some of the 
changes (for example, establishing the anti-cor-
ruption institutions, the gas sector reform and 
the changes linked to visa liberalisation) threat-
ening that financial support would be withheld 
otherwise. Constant pressure from the EU has 
made it possible to break resistance from the po-
litical forces and the bureaucratic system, which 
are reluctant to introduce the changes that will 
improve the transparency of the government 
system’s operation. The continuation of the re-
form process will also depend on constant and 
consistent pressure from such institutions as the 
EU and the IMF. However, it is important that 
international pressure is present not only at the 
stage of adopting legal acts but also when the 
new solutions are being put into practice.
Ukraine is still to introduce the systemic chang-
es that will make the reform process irrevers-
ible. It could be claimed that the last year or 
so has been wasted to a certain extent due to 
indolence and, in some areas, the lack of politi-
cal will, resistance from certain interest groups, 
and the ineffective bureaucratic apparatus. The 
political elite failed to capitalise on the great 
public mobilisation during the first few months 
after Maidan, which was the best period for in-
troducing the reforms. Much seems to indicate 
that the conditions for reforming the state will 
be harder in the coming months. This is due to 
both the ever stronger internal political dispute 
– and thus difficulty in maintaining political sta-
bility – and the growing impatience and disillu-
sionment among the Ukrainian public. As many 
as 68% of Ukrainians believe that their country 
is going in the wrong direction21, which means 
that the public’s ‘preferential treatment’ of the 
Ukrainian government has ended and that pro-
tests cannot be ruled out, especially given the 
fact that civil pressure has become an import-
ant element of Ukrainian politics since Maidan. 
In addition to this, the conflict in Donbass has 
not yet been completely ‘frozen’, and the war 
with Russia still continues. The combination 
of all these elements allows the belief that the 
process of reforming Ukraine, which has just 
begun, will take a long time, the public will not 
feel its effects soon, and its outcome still re-
mains unclear. 
21 Rating Group survey conducted for IRI in September 
2015. 67% of Ukrainians shared this opinion in Septem-
ber 2013.
